

ANTI-SEMITIC PREJUDICE
IN TODAY'S HUNGARIAN SOCIETY

RESEARCH REPORT

AUTHORS:
ENDRE HANN AND DÁNIEL RÓNA

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
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1. INTRODUCTION¹



On behalf of Action and Protection Foundation, Medián Public Opinion and Market Research Institute conducted an overall research in November 2016 about the relation of Hungarian society to Jews:

- about views and opinions related to Jews
- about the frequency and strength of anti-Semitic prejudice
- about opinions related to the Holocaust and remembrance
- about associations related to Jews

The research was conducted with a questionnaire by personal interviews with 1200 participants. Participants were all over 18 years of age.

The slight distortions of the sample were corrected by a mathematical procedure, called weighting, using the statistics published by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH). So the sample accurately represents the composition of the population according to type of settlements, gender,

age group and school qualification. The sampling error of the published data is maximum +/-3% depending on the ratio of the answers in the complete sample.

The research methodology was based on the conception² elaborated by András Kovács. In the course of the research, we predominantly used the questionnaire applied and used frequently by him since 1995, which presents the change of data from period to period.

In the course of the research, the interviewers of Medián asked the respondents for a relatively long term of time; for about 30 minutes questions were asked related to Jews. Before we present the significant amount of data, we must clarify what is and what is not shown by the data of the questionnaires.

At the beginning of our study, we wish to highlight, with indirect evidence how much an average Hungarian citizen cares about the views, opinions and latest happenings related to Jews; how important this question is for voters. Keeping this in mind, we find it useful to elaborate on the problems of measurement of anti-Semitism and prejudice. After the clarification of methodological questions, we first present the frequency of views on Jews and attitudes towards them, then we examine which groups of society are primarily affected by these attitudes. As a next step, we list the data referring to associations related to Jews, Israel, the Holocaust and the remembrance of past. At the end of our study we will define which of the analyzed factors is most likely to increase the probability of anti-Semitism.

¹ The structure and the method of the study is in line with the study of 2015. The explication of the methodology also stems from it.
² András Kovács: *The Stranger at Hand. Anti-Semitic Prejudices in post-Communist Hungary*. Brill, Leiden-Boston 2011.

2. THE PERCEPTION, THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS OF JEWS

As this year's data shows, similar to last year's research, the affairs related to Jews are on the periphery of Hungarian voters' attention. This is not surprising, people's attention is drawn to issues in which they are directly involved.

According to the content analysis of NMHH³, in 2016, none of the cases which were linked to Jews made it to the top 20 most noticed themes on the main broadcast channels⁴. In 2014, the debate on the monument at Szabadság square got a measurable amount of publicity but only for one month, with not more than a middle range value. After that, in 2015, there was no case linked to Jews among the most frequented themes of the agenda.

Our survey shows that the news related to Jews only reach a small group of voters. We studied with the help of open questions (meaning questions without pre-listed answers) that how many people mention the events happened to Jews. We can only declare that someone cares about them if he or she is able to name at least one single concrete case. After the 11% of last year, only 10% of the respondents was able to name a

concrete case in 2016, but even these answers were proved to be superficially informative ("creation of a statue", "Mazsichisz", "threats against Jews"). Respondents didn't seem to be fully up-to-date in this topic. The relative majority of this 10% mentioned the creation of the statue and a Jewish Cultural Festival. In January 2016, the Hungarian press and a part of the intellectuals found it important when American President Obama stated, with reference to the statue of Hóman, that they managed to convince the Hungarian government not to create the statue. This was recalled by neither of the respondents, and it didn't make it to the top 20 most frequently published news in the content analysis of the press. Based on this evidence, we have a reason to suppose that the questions made for our analysis, the reference to Jews (social distance, prejudice and attitudes) lag behind on the scale of importance of an average citizen.

In the rest of our study, all data needs to be analyzed in this context. Only a small, but significant, part of the respondents finds our topic relevant.

³ http://mediatanacs.hu/tart/index/1004/Politikusok_partok_a_hirmusorokban

⁴ Even the Hanuka greeting of Gábor Vona did not make it to the top 20 cases in December, 2016.

3. THE MEASUREMENT OF ANTI-SEMITISM AND PREJUDICE

Based on the findings, we can say that the question “How much do you find Jews likeable?” can only show the *direction* of the approach, but not the weight dedicated to the question. Whether it is a like or a dislike, even behind the two extreme values, it is not about the significantly important emotion or motivation of the respondent. It is equally important to emphasize that the quantitative survey is able to point out an opinion, a prejudice or an attitude but hardly real behavior.

According to the interpretation which we find correct, the questions measuring anti-Semitism reveal primarily attitudes; it is about a manifestation of which one characteristic is the variability.

It is worth examination, based on the time scale comparison, whether opinions related to Jews tend be the sympathetic or hostile. During the course of the survey, we differ-

entiated two dimensions of attitudes towards Jews based on the previous methodology of András Kovács: a cognitive rejection based on ideas, misconceptions and conspiracy theories in relation to Jews and secondly affective anti-Semitism based on the level of general emotional rejection and social distance kept. When we sum up the two dimensions, we will be able to see how many of the respondents are characterized by both attitudes and the extent they reach. Those who hardly agree with any statements against Jews are grouped in the category of “non anti-Semitic”, those who agree with some of the statements are grouped as “moderately anti-Semitic” and those who agreed with most of the statements are called “strongly anti-Semitic”. We emphasize again that these categories don’t express the importance of the question and show nothing about the actions of the respondent.

4. THE LEVEL OF ANTI-SEMITISM

COGNITIVE ANTI-SEMITISM

So far, we have measured the content of anti-Semitic prejudice with a questionnaire frequently used during the past two decades on ideas and “learnings” linked to Jews.

We asked the respondents to indicate on a five-point-scale how much they agree with the eight statements we stated. The state-

ments contain traditional type of anti-Semitism based on religious beliefs called anti-Judaism and also a stereotype against Jews which stems from the belief that Jews have disproportionate influence. There is a statement suggesting that Jews should be pushed back in different areas of life.

Table 1 shows the proportion of those who “fully” or “rather” agree with the statements (values of four or five of the scale).

Table 1. The content of prejudiceness against Jews (the proportion of those who agree, percent)


	év	teljesen egyetért	egyetért
The Jewish intellectuals control the press and the culture	2006	12	19
	2011	14	21
	2013	11	18
	2015	14	19
	2016	14	18
A secret Jewish conspiracy exists which defines the political and economical procedures	2006	10	17
	2011	14	20
	2013	15	19
	2015	15	20
	2016	17	19
Jewish influence is too broad today in Hungary	2013	12	15
	2015	15	17
	2016	16	21
It would be the best if Jews left the country	2006	5	7
	2011	8	12
	2013	6	9
	2015	9	11
	2016	8	10
In the case of certain professions, the number of Jews should be limited	2006	5	10
	2011	7	12
	2013	5	11
	2015	8	13
2016	9	16	
The Crucifixion of Jesus is the unforgivable fault of Jews	2006	8	12
	2011	9	12
	2013	7	8
	2015	10	15
	2016	11	14
The suffering of Jews was the punishment of God	2006	7	7
	2011	5	9
	2013	4	7
	2015	7	11
	2016	10	11
Jews are more likely than others to use sinful tools in order to reach their goals	2006	8	13
	2011	9	17
	2013	7	15
	2015	11	15
	2016	13	16

To sum up, we can conclude that the statements above meets onethird or one- fourth of the opinion of the population. The first three statements are the most popular which refer to the “excessive” or “dangerous” influence of Jews. This can be related to the fact that every fourth respondent agreed with the statement representing the spirit of Numerus Clausus. Maybe the most frightening data is that 18% of the respondents supported the departure of Jews. There is no major change between the certain years, yet, there is a gradual increase since 2006. Five out of eight statements hit the “top value” with regard to the proportion of those who agreed, especially the number of those increased who perceive exaggerated influence. *There was no single statement with which the respondents agreed on a smaller scale than they did over the past years.*

We can summarize that based on the tendency in terms of time, cognitive an-

ti-Semitism slightly but clearly increased in Hungary. This is shown by the first chart where we created three categories by adding the values of the scale of each and every respondent for all eight statements. This way, the lowest scale value was eight and the highest was eight times five, so 40 in total. We placed those to the first group (non anti-Semitic) who maybe accept certain discriminating stereotypes but based on the value of their answers, they attained a low point on the scale (from eight to 20 points). We put those to the second group (moderately anti-Semitic) who showed medium level prejudice (from 21 to 30 points) and the third group contained those who are strongly anti-Semitic based on their results (from 31 to 40 points). Finally we placed those who gave no answer or their answer was “I don’t know” in category of “miscellaneous”, but just to be clear we only show the proportions without the lack of answers.

Chart I. The proportion of cognitive anti-Semitic people in Hungarian society, 2013-2016 (percentage)



This dimension of the chart shows that the proportion of non anti-Semitic people has gradually decreased while the proportion of strongly anti-Semites has increased each year. According to our opinion, this tendency can be linked to the nowday's actual phenomenon called "politics after the truth". The voter can hardly isolate reliable information from complete nonsense,

especially because disinformation or the dissemination of conspiracy theories form a core part of politicians' strategy. If we accept the statement that it is harder and harder to find the way for an average news reader, then we have to see that it is true for several topics including anti-Semitism. It is becoming more and more difficult to reject misconceptions as their number is increas-

2. táblázat. Az egyes antiszemita kijelentések elfogadása az antiszemitizmus szerinti csoportokban (2016, százalék)

	strongly anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	non anti-Semitic
It is a threat that the Jewish intellectuals control the press and the culture	96	43	3
A secret Jewish conspiracy exists which fact defines the political and economical procedures	95	41	8
Jewish influence is too broad in Hungary today	96	43	6
Jews are more likely to use sinful tools in order to reach their goals then others	88	35	3
It would be the best if Jews left the country	77	21	2
In the case of certain professions, the number of Jews should be limited	85	33	1
The Crucifixion of Jesus is the unforgivable fault of Jews	77	37	6
The suffering of Jews was the punishment of God	66	24	8

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ing and they get publicity as well as political support. We find this a realistic scenario because, as we will see, the emotional and general dislike of Jews haven't recently increased during the past years; actually it has slightly decreased.


Table 2 illustrates the consistency: based on the three groups, in the great majority of cases it is perfectly "predictable" how

the respondents will answer the certain questions on cognitive anti-Semitism. For example, 8% of the respondents among non anti-Semites believe in the existence of hidden Jewish collaboration and "only" 69% of strongly anti-Semitic people agree with the last statement of anti-Judaism. Basically, the eight statements show a very similar pattern in the groups based on anti-Semitism.

THE AFFECTIVE ANTI-SEMITISM

This chart shows the emotional relation to Jews by using three questions. First, we asked the respondents to tell us whether Jews are rather likable or unlikable to them.

Chart 2. The emotional rejection of Jews (proportions by percentage)



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The most shocking lesson learnt from the chart is the significant increase, the permanent change in public opinion between 2009 and 2010. The earlier attained 10% is now above 20%. Although the value is always slightly higher in the year of the elections, the sharp increase in 2010 can't be explained by this. It seems a realistic assumption that one of the reasons of this sharp increase is the dislike against Jews in public speech as it became more legitimate

after Jobbik gained ground and became mainstream in public life. The emotional rejection fluctuates between 21-16% since 2010 but last year it decreased significantly.

The second question is very similar to that but instead of choosing from two options, respondents had to express their feelings towards Jews and other ethnicities on a scale of 9. We publish average scores in Table 3, 9 meaning full sympathy and 1 meaning complete dislike.

Table 3. The sympathy index of Jews and other ethnicities on a nine-points-scale

	Arab	Roma	black	Romanians	Chinese	Swabians	Jews	migrants
2006	3,87	3,33	4,55	4,70	3,77	5,38	5,02	-
2007	3,66	3,03	4,24	4,00	3,80	5,48	5,00	-
2009	4,37	3,39	4,72	4,11	4,09	5,75	5,24	-
2010	4,04	3,64	4,26	4,23	4,01	4,86	4,47	-
2011	3,93	3,63	4,48	4,44	4,11	5,14	4,61	-
2013	4,06	3,69	4,20	4,26	4,12	4,96	4,53	-
2014	4,09	3,64	4,28	4,45	4,33	5,30	4,73	-
2015	3,32	3,29	3,96	4,41	4,44	5,79	5,09	2,84
2016	3,48	3,5	4,12	4,69	4,48	5,87	5,32	2,75
correlation coefficient with the sympathy towards Jews	0,281**	0,225**	0,442**	0,519**	0,470**	0,583**	-	0,246**

* The correlation coefficient is a statistical indicator which expresses the strength of the relationship between two variables. The value of the variable is one if one of the variable is completely defined by the other variable. The value of the variable is zero when they are completely independent from each other. For example, if the correlation coefficient is 0,583 between Jews and Swabians, it means a very strong relation between the two sympathy scales: mainly the same respondents like or dislike both ethnicities. The other relations are slightly weaker but still significant (on the level of 95%, that's what the two stars indicate).

First, what we see from this table is the popularity of each ethnicity. It was always the Roma population who was the mostly rejected group of society, but in 2015 another group became ever more rejected: migrants. The predominantly and significantly negative opinion against migrants is marked by the fact that the scores of those ethnicities significantly decreased compared to 2014 who can be identified with migrants by an ordinary citizen, such as Arab and black people. The perception of the two minorities hit the low point in 2015, their value slightly increased since. The perception of the other ethnicities is more favorable, the Jews, right behind the Swabians are the second most accepted group of people. At the same time, data also shows that xenophobia in general is quite a strong phenomenon in society. Only few people gave an average score of more than five to any ethnicity.


When it comes to change in terms of time, the shift between 2009 and 2010 was

the most remarkable in most groups' cases. The average score of sympathy of Jews hit the top but this goes for all the groups who are not identified with migrants. It is possible that the slightly increasing sympathy of recent years is a sign of general approach rather than an outstandingly positive opinion on Jews.

The last column of table 3 also highlights that the emotional relation to Jews is probably going hand-in-hand with the like or dislike of any other groups. The correlation is especially strong between the Jews and the Romanians, Swabians, Chinese and black people. The relationship is significant in cases of the other ethnicities as well. This means that mostly the same respondents found Jews dislikeable than Swabians and other ethnicities (see footprint under Table 3). *Anti-Semitism then goes hand-in-hand with general xenophobia.*

In our third question, we measured the aversion and the distance kept from Jews and other ethnicities or minorities.

Chart 3. Social distance from certain groups. "Would not agree to have a ... neighbour" (2013-2016, percent)



It is very clear that "otherness" is not widely accepted in Hungary. Even from the most accepted groups, one-third to one-fifth of society would keep distance. The majority of society dislikes gay people and the great majority dislikes immigrants. The relative position of Jews is considered to be favorable compared to the other groups. Similarly to Table 3, we assume that there is another phenomenon behind the increase of total points of Jews, since the values of Swabians, Chinese, Transylvanians and Americans changed in a similar way. The recently presented two sets of data (Table 3 and Chart 3) show that the appearance of migrants in the questionnaire had strong impact on the values of other groups as well. When it comes to questionnaires, context has always a strong impact on answers. Just

because a strongly rejected group appeared in the questionnaire and respondents identified other two groups, Arabs and black people with them, the other ethnicities' values increased. Except for Roma and skinhead groups, who are also strongly rejected by society, each group, including Jews, has a more positive perception in 2016 than before; probably because the respondents rated them compared to migrants.

The question concerning neighborhood strengthens the conclusion that anti-Semitism is often the broader manifestation of xenophobia. Those respondents who are not keen on living in the neighborhood of the above mentioned ethnicities or minorities are more likely to reject Jews (Table 4). This is what the table illustrates: how strongly the like or dislike towards Jews is related com-

pared to the popularity of other groups. For example 86% of those who accept Swabians in the neighborhood would accept Jews as well (Column 1) and out of those who reject Swabians, only every fourth person would accept Jews (Column 2).

Table 4. The proportion of those who would agree to have a Jewish neighbour... (2016, percent)


	among those who agree to have a ... neighbour	among those would NOT agree to have a ... neighbour
black	92	55
migrant	92	64
arab	95	60
homosexual	87	56
romanian	91	43
gypsy	90	62
chinese	88	49
swabish	86	25
american	85	30
skinhead	82	67

It is interesting to see that xenophobia affects everyone who is "different". We could easily think that Jews and skinheads are rejected by totally different people but it is the opposite; the person who rejects skinheads would be very likely to reject Jews too. For the great majority of Hungarian society, "being a Jew" is just another form of being *different* and this *quality* generates the dislike towards Jews just as towards any form of "otherness".

Based on the first three sets of data, following the tradition of research and sum-

merizing the data of Chart 2 and Table 3, we can conclude the level of anti-Semitism in Hungarian society⁵. As it can be seen on Chart 4, affective anti-Semitism increased in 2010 and decreased to some extent since. The ratio of non anti-Semites has increased since 2013 on a yearly basis. (This increase of the past two years can be affected by the context on the situation of migrants.) In total, it seems that the general emotional rejection of Jews affects three respondents out of ten and within that category, affective anti-Semitism affects less than two people.

Chart 4. The evolution of the ratio of those who reject Jews on emotional basis 2003-2016 (percent)



⁵ Those respondents who feel dislike towards Jews and marked a value of 1-5 on the dislike index, we categorized as "strongly anti-Semitic". We grouped those as "moderately anti-Semitic" who feel dislike towards Jews but marked only 1-3 values. All the rest of the respondents fell into the category of non anti-Semitic.


We also examined the consistency of those responses which were given for the three questions related to the emotional dimension (Chart 2 and 3, Table 3). We considered those people's way of thinking consistent who chose the same direction for all three questions (whether he or she is for or against Jews). Based on this logic, we found that 63% of respondents' way of thinking is consistent; 27% is non-consistent. Some respondents from the second group gave an anti-Semitic answer to one question and a non anti-Semitic answer to the other (the rest of them, about 10%, gave an answer "I don't know"). This leads us to the integration of the questions into one dimension, but, at the same time, it highlights that a great part of the respondents found the questions strange. Respondents had no mature and unsha-

kable position so probably they have never thought about these questions before.

THE RATIO OF ANTI-SEMITICS BASED ON THE CUMULATION OF THE TWO DIMENSIONS

The groups of people who think in an anti-Semitic way and feel in an anti-Semitic way are not identical, their membership differ and overlap at the same time. We merge these two dimensions in our analysis. We consider those people strongly anti-Semitic who are qualified as anti-Semitic in both groups or at least in one group and moderately anti-Semitic in the other. We consider those moderately anti-Semitic who fell into this category in both dimensions or those who fell into the category of strongly

Chart 5. The ratio of anti-Semitic people in Hungarian Society, 2006-2016 (percentage)



anti-Semitic in one dimension and non anti-Semitic in the other dimension.

Based on these categories, we can see that about one-third of society is affected by some level of anti-Semitism and one-fifth is strongly anti-Semitic. The tendency based

on time is very similar to the partial components. Anti-Semitism significantly increased between 2006 and 2011. Until 2014, it slightly decreased, and it hasn't changed significantly since. We will use this integrated indicator in the rest of our study.

5. WHO ARE ANTI-SEMITIC?

PREJUDICE AND DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS


When we take a close look at the relation between anti-Semitism and social background, we have to realize that their connection is very weak. *Prejudice to Jews is a characteristic of every social group to the same extent; there is no major divergence.*

In harmony with previous results, men are more susceptible to anti-Semitism than women. When it comes to age groups, we can see that middle aged citizens (30-59) are more likely to be anti-Semites than the

youngest (18-29) and the oldest generation (60 and above). We have seen a similar pattern in 2015. The distribution according to settlements have slightly changed. Last year, those who live in small settlements were more likely to show the signs of anti-Semitism, but in 2016 this tendency became more even; divergences disappeared among the different types of settlements. There is no major difference regarding education either. Only people having university diploma show a lower ratio of anti-Semitism (compared to 2015, this difference is a bit sharper). At the same time, it is a new tendency that there is

Chart 6. Anti-Semitism according to affinity of members of social groups (2016, percentage)

● strongly anti-Semitic ● moderately anti-Semitic ● non anti-Semitic



a significant difference among people having different levels of income. Rich people's anti-Semitism decreased, and poor people's anti-Semitism increased a little. It would be an exaggeration to say that anti-Semitism is limited to unsuccessful people living at the peripheries of society and experiencing permanent existential threats. Anti-Semitism equally affects physical and intellectual workers and the correlation is considered to be weak or average.

ANTI-SEMITISM AND RELIGIOUSNESS

Several questions were asked regarding religion and religiousness. We examined

if there is relationship between prejudice to Jews and religiousness and the frequency of attending and belonging to a church. We didn't perceive as many differences as in the case of demographic properties. The extent of anti-Semitism doesn't depend on the extent of religiousness of the individual or the type of church he or she belongs to. Maybe we can point out a little bit less anti-Semitic respondents among non-religious people, but statistically the differences among the values of other groups are not significant. Anti-Semitism based on religious grounds or anti-Judaism has no significant correlation to religiousness.

Chart 7. Anti-Semitism according to religiousness (2016, percentage)

● strongly anti-Semitic ● moderately anti-Semitic ● non anti-Semitic

	strongly anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	non anti-Semitic
overall population	20	13	67
Calvinist	19	17	63
religious in his or her own way	25	14	61
doesn't belong to congregation	23	12	65
only at major Holidays, family events	21	15	64
doesn't participate at religious life	22	11	67
non-religious	14	13	72
belongs to a congregation	17	14	69
attends church several times a year	17	13	70

ANTI-SEMITISM AND SOCIAL ATTITUDES

We carefully examined the role of attitudes and political views besides the affinity of members of social groups. Based on the responses, we examined if the agreement with socio-political questions increases the probability of anti-Semitism. The results confirmed the previous research findings that anti-Semitic prejudice is in close coherence with beliefs non-directly related to Jews such as euro-skepticism, xenophobia, law-and-order conservative views, trust in certain moral and social norms, rules. The closest correlation is to the rejection of ho-


mosexuality, abortion, EU membership and the limitation of the number of people of color. There is also a significant connection with law-and order status; those who support the death penalty and the imprisonment of drug consumers are more likely to become anti-Semites. Statements representing a pessimistic view of society are not significantly correlated to anti-Semitism ("In this country, one can only become rich by acting dishonestly" and "The leaders of this country don't really care about the destiny of people like you.") This is a little bit surprising because much research shows that the main incentive to become anti-Semitic is feeling betrayed.

Compared to the results of 2015, the most significant difference is that anti-Semitism decreased among nationalists.⁶ Even in the case of the rejection of homosexuality and abortion, there is less correlation

to anti-Semitism than in 2015. At the same time, it is still justified that socio-political attitudes project the potential anti-Semitism of respondents much more clearly than demographical properties.

Chart 8. Anti-Semitism and socio-political attitudes (2016, percentage)

● strongly anti-Semitic ● moderately anti-Semitic ● non anti-Semitic



⁶ "People with nationalist values should be decision makers."; "It is still today's moral obligation to stand up against the decisions of the Trianon Treaty."; "The protection of our national values is more important than the EU membership."

ANTI-SEMITISM AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES

In the following chapter, we will examine if there is a relationship between anti-Semitism and political self-identification, the choice of political parties and willingness to participate at elections. Based on three questions, our respondents had to position themselves on a seven-points-scale: left-right, conservative-liberal and moderate-radical dimensions.

Compared to the overall population, anti-Semites are closer to the right side and radical poles on average but they are only marginally linked to the conservatives. At

the same time, based on the average scores, it is clear that even among left-wingers, liberals and moderate voters, there are respondents who agree with anti-Semitic statements. The anti-Semitic interviewees are likely to tend to the right wing from the average score of four, although due to the unpopularity of the left wing parties, the entire society is shifted to the right. There were no major differences on the conservative-liberal pole. It is interesting to see that strongly anti-Semitic people place themselves precisely to the middle of the moderate-radical scale. Compared to 2015, there is less relationship between anti-Semitism and radicalism.

Table 5. Political self-identification and anti-Semitism, 2016 (averages on a scale from 1 to 7)

	strongly anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	non anti-Semitic	overall population 2016	overall population 2015
left wing (1) – right wing (7)	5,45	4,55	4,23	4,50	4,65
conservative (1) – liberal (7)	3,37	3,64	3,57	3,54	3,65
moderate (1) – radical (7)	3,98	3,52	3,18	3,38	3,38


21

Political interest and the closely related willingness to participate at the elections have a weak relation to anti-Semitism. The probability of responses against Jews is slightly increasing in harmony with the

increase of activities (chart 9). We assume that anti-Semite voters can be a bit louder, in other words, they are more likely to make public statements so the ratio of this group can be over exaggerated by public opinion.

Chart 9. Anti-Semitism and willingness to participate at the elections (2016, percentage)

● strongly anti-Semitic ● moderately anti-Semitic ● non anti-Semitic



Political preferences show a much stronger relationship to anti-Semitism than the already presented factors (Chart 10). 46% of Jobbik voters fell into the category of strongly anti-Semitic and a further 11% were considered as moderately anti-Semitic. This ratio was the highest among the involved variables of the analysis. At the same time, strongly anti-Semitic voters created absolute majority among Jobbik voters in 2014. Their ratio slightly decreased in 2015, but there was no further decrease in 2016. Jobbik's populist decline strategy had very little impact. (Data was collected in November 2016, before the exchange of Hanukah greetings. Pro-government communities' relationship to Jews is average.)


Among the supporters of DK and the left-wing parties, especially small parties such

as Munkáspárt, MOMA, Együtt, PM, Liberals, we find much less anti-Semitic voters. Yet, there is some difference among them as Medián pointed this out in the opinions related to migration⁹.

Socialist voters seem to be in the middle between right-wing parties and other left-wing parties (together with LMP voters and those who are uncertain). Furthermore the scores of MSZP slightly deteriorated compared to 2015. (Although in these cases, due to small sample size, statistical error is significant.) In any case, data shows that anti-Semitism is not the very characteristic of a certain political party or political side. One-third of respondents voting for Fidesz or for the socialists fell into the anti-Semitic category while four out of ten Jobbik voters didn't.

Chart 10. Anti-Semitism according to political party preferences (2016, percentage)

● strongly anti-Semitic ● moderately anti-Semitic ● non anti-Semitic



6. THE HOLOCAUST AND THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE PAST

The remembrance of the Shoah is among top wounds both in Hungarian anti-Semitic and Jewish communities. Many conflicts stem from the different interpretations. Therefore, the survey contained a set of questions which focused on the views regarding the necessity of facing the historic past and the responsibility related to the Holocaust during World War II.


Table 6. Opinions on the Holocaust and on the challenges of the past, 2009-2016 (percentage, positive statements regarding Jews are shown in *italics*)

	rather agrees						
	2006	2009	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016
1. During the war, non-Jewish Hungarians suffered just as much as Jews.	56	66	65	65	60	64	70
2. There were no gas chambers in death camps.	7	6	7	8	12	11	11
3. The number of Jewish victims was a lot lower than it is generally stated.	14	12	18	19	23	23	24
4. Much more should be taught about Holocaust at schools so this could never happen again.	45	54	46	50	42	46	52
5. Great majority of horrifying stories was made up by Jews afterwards.	9	11	13	14	15	19	18
6. This topic should be removed from the agenda after so many decades following the Holocaust.	48	40	58	53	54	50	52

Opinions differ on how much talk and attention should be devoted to anti-Semitism especially in schools: “more” (statement 4) and “less” (statement 6) is supported by 50-50% of society. Although the great majority of voters distance themselves from denying or relativising of the Holocaust, a non-significant part of respondents does. Complete denial is found among 11% of respondents (statement 2), partial denial and relativising 18-24% (statement 3 and 5). Moreover, this ratio has increased over the past years (chart 11). As we mentioned it in the case of cognitive anti-Semitism, we

find it possible that behind this data, there is a growing responsiveness to conspiracy theories (“the politics after the truth”) and some general paranoia instead of the open denial of the Holocaust. When it comes to alterations in terms of time, 2011 represents the negative turning point in this case. As for Holocaust denying or relativising statements, the turning point is 2014. There was no major change in the past two years, except for the first and fourth statement where acceptance rate increased. This is a favorable tendency from the Jew’s judgment point of view.

Chart 11. The ratio of those who agree with Holocaust-denying and relativising statements 2006-2016 (percentage)



When we look at the pattern of responses related to the Holocaust in relation to the categories according to anti-Semitism (Table 7), we end up with a slightly surprising result. We would assume that positive statements related to Jews would fully be supported by non anti-Semites and negative statements by strong anti-Semites. Data shows that each hypothesis is more sophisticated than that. Naturally, the anti-Semitic, mainly the strongly anti-Semitic group was proven to be less emphatic to Jews than the non anti-Semitic group. At the same time, the Holocaust denying or relativising statements are met by one-fifth or one-tenth of non anti-Semitic respondents’ opinion.

Even more surprising is that according to more than one-third of strongly anti-Semites respondents’ opinion, more talk should be devoted to the Holocaust, especially at schools. One-fifth of them think that more talk should be devoted to the Holocaust and they think Jews suffered more than Hungarians. This is explained by the assumption that some of them have no clear relation to the hidden dilemmas of the questions or some of them don’t even understand them. Anyway, it seems clear that the judgement on the dilemmas related to the remembrance of the past is only partially related to anti-Semitism. As it was phrased in the report of 2013 by András Kovács, “it is a mis-

take to assume a direct relationship between anti-Semitism and reluctance to face the past: anti-Semitism is not the reason for the reluctance of facing the past and this latter doesn't necessarily stem from the intention to legitimate anti-Semitism.”

Table 7. Anti-Semitism and opinions on the Holocaust, 2016
(percentage of those who agree, positive statements regarding Jews are shown in italics)

	strongly anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	non anti-Semitic
1. During the war, non-Jewish Hungarians suffered just as much as Jews.	81	72	62
2. There were no gas chambers in death camps.	34	17	10
3. The number of Jewish victims was a lot lower than it is generally stated.	57	38	19
4. Much more should be taught about Holocaust at schools so this could never happen again.	37	46	55
5. Great majority of horrifying stories was made up by Jews afterwards.	46	31	15
6. This topic should be removed from the agenda after so many decades following the Holocaust.	80	73	40

7. ISRAEL AND ANTI-SEMITISM

Opinions and emotions related to Israel have a significant role in the perception of Jews. Although the dislike (and the opposite) against Jews doesn't necessarily stem from the criticism of the politics of Israel, it is a general phenomenon when prejudice to Jews is presented in the form of criticism of the Jewish State. Way before Jobbik appeared on the political scene, banalities formed an integral part of Hungarian everyday language, so it seemed to be justified to ask a few questions in the questionnaire and point out the answers of the responses of

Jobbik's supporters (Table 8 and 9). The relation to Israel can be measured in the best possible way by asking open questions (without pre-phrased answers) from respondents and test what they associate to by hearing the name of Israel. This way, they will not join to a pre-existing opinion but mention what they think first so probably what they really find important. We present the different answers of different respondents in Table 8 by categories, the same type of answers are grouped into the same category without demonstrating 28% of lack of answers.

Table 8. "What comes to your mind when you hear the word: Israel?"
(Data of 2016, open questions, percentage of mentionings)

The nature and groupings of hints and the most frequently mentioned items within the category	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	voters of Jobbik	entire sample 2016	entire sample 2015
Descriptive, neutral: land of Jews, country, state, religion, Middle-East, Arab, language	63	53	38	50	57	47
Negative but hard to tell if Arabs or Jews are blamed: war, terrorism, explosions, fear, tension	24	42	39	32	31	34
Attractions, rather positive: Jesus, Jerusalem, Wailing Wall, Nazareth, Bible, synagogue, nice country	6	4	6	4	5	11
Negative to Israel: Fanatical, aggressive, murderer, evil, illegitimate, disgust, tyrant	6	1	15	14	6	4
Money, richness, power, influence	1	0	2	0	1	3
World War 2, the Holocaust	0	0	0	0	0	1
In total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The majority of the answers, 57% was descriptive and neutral without any potential emotional conclusion (“land of the Jews”, “state”, “religion” and other similar answers). 34% thought of the war in the Middle-East, terrorism and attacks, but the associations didn’t lead to a conclusion whether the respondents blame the Jews or the Arabs for the conflict. About every twentieth respondent mentioned a tourist attraction which is more positive by nature than negative. Only 6% of the respondents made concrete negative remarks concerning Israel (one of the last categories “money”, “richness”, “influence” got one percent of the answers and it was rather driven by jealousy than respect). If we examine the correlation to anti-Semitism, we see very little differences, only the contemptuous remarks appeared more often among anti-Semitic and Jobbik respondents which don’t significantly differ from the entire sample

in other categories. It is a remarkable result that mentioning tourist attractions, references to the Bible, terrorism and war was just as typical to the Jobbik group than to any other groups.

This leads us to the conclusion that the first thought of the majority of respondents who are classified as anti-Semitic is not a negative one when they hear the word “Israel” or “Jews”, as we will later see. When we call their attention to anti-Semitic aspects or points of view against Israel, they are more likely to agree than others. Anti-Semitism is rather a responsiveness in their case rather than a stable state of mind.

When it comes to the change in term of time (last two columns), the descriptive answers became more frequent versus the second and third category. The quantity of anti-Semitic associations didn’t change between 2015 and 2016. The associations are completed by reactions, agreements or rejections of respondents in relation to Israel.

Table 9. Anti-Semitism and opinions on Israel, 2016
(The ratio of those who agree, percentage; 5 – fully agrees, 1 – doesn’t agree at all; agrees = 5 and 4 integrated)

	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	voters of Jobbik	entire sample 2016	entire sample 2015
The Jews living here are more loyal to Israel than to Hungary	18	43	65	34	31	27
The Hungarian Jews would rather cheer for Israel than to Hungary at a Hungarian-Israeli soccer game	19	36	62	44	30	29
Israel is a legitimate prosecutor of a self-defensing war against the offenses to the country	33	33	32	20	33	25
The political system of Israel is more democratic than that of the Arab countries which attack the Jewish state	32	22	25	16	29	27
I am more understanding towards Israel than earlier after having seen the more and more brutal Islamic terrorist attacks	33	34	32	19	33	23
Israel is an aggressor, carrying out genocide against Palestinians	22	35	51	33	29	28

The first two questions are almost the same but they are differently phrased, still every fifth respondent gave an opposite answer to them. A further 29% answered “I don’t know” to at least one of them. Only 38% answered the questions consistently⁸. It shows that a good part of the respondents seemed to be unfamiliar with these issues, a lot of people have no clear position (the ratio of the answer “I don’t know” was 15-20% in the case of other statements related to Israel).

In total, we can say that the population is rather dismissive to all statements. The first and last statement was the most concrete, this is what we see from the pattern of answers: primarily, anti-Semitic respondents thought that Hungarian Jews are rather loyal to Israel and considered Israel as an aggressor. The agreement with the statement “The political system of Israel is more democratic than that of the Arab countries which attack the Jewish state” is completely independent from the general views related to Jews. Probably a lot of respondents didn’t fully understand this complex issue. The supporters of Jobbik were a bit more critical of Israel, but the differences were much less

than we anticipated based on the position of the political party⁹.

When we analyze the change in terms of time, there is a significant shift in the case of two statements, both show that Hungarian public opinion became more tolerant with Israel over the past two years. The legitimacy of the self-defense war of Israel was acknowledged by 22% in 2014, 25% in 2015 and 33% in 2016. Due to the terrorist attacks, this year every third respondent showed empathy and understanding towards Israel; last year it was only 23%. It goes against intuitive expectations that even respondents who were classified as anti-Semitic in other questions stood up for the Jewish state in the same (significant) ratio. If we take into consideration that the very same respondents were the most hostile towards migrant and Arab people, this correlation is easier to understand. Another conclusion is that the judgment of Jews and Israel only improved in the context of migration which can lead us back to the dislike against Arab and Muslim people who can be easily identified as being migrants. This goes for those respondents who dislike Jews.

⁸ Based on the two five-points-scale questions, we regarded those respondents fully consequent who gave the same value to both questions.
⁹ Even in 2014, Gábor Vona wanted a total break in diplomatic relations between Hungary and Israel.

8. ASSOCIATIONS WITH JEWS

We tested with the help of open questions what comes to people’s mind when they hear the word “Jew”. Similarly to the previous chapters, we grouped similar answers to the same category without demonstrating 28% of lack of answers.

Table 10. “What comes to your mind first when you hear the word Jew?” (2016, open questions, spontaneous answers in groups according to the level of anti-Semitism, in percentage of respondents)

	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	voters of Jobbik	entire sample 2016	entire sample 2015
Persecution , Holocaust, Auschwitz, World War 2, suffering	30	24	25	26	28	23
Neutral hints: religion, ethnic group, customs, culture, Bible, language	32	19	9	21	26	26
Money , power, richness, commerce, USA, influence	17	36	29	19	22	22
Negative characteristics: desire for power, hunger for money, exploitation, avarice, laziness, hatred	4	9	25	23	9	13
Positive: intelligent, tolerant, hard working, human	7	1	3	3	6	3
They are the same as others. I don’t care about who is Jewish and who is not.	5	4	1	3	4	3
Palestinian-Jewish conflict	3	0	5	1	3	4
Physical signs (sideburns, nose, etc.)	2	3	2	2	2	2
Relative, neighbour, acquaintance	0	0	0	0	0	2
Food (kosher, etc.)	0	4	1	2	0	2
	100	100	100	100	100	100

The table starts the overview with the most frequently mentioned features in 2016. This is why the category of persecution is in the first position, which is considered neutral. The second category is neutral too.

Here, we find descriptive elements; we have no clear idea about the emotions of the respondent by mentioning the word “Jew”. In total, these two groups form the absolute majority of respondents in 2016. The

thoughts such as “money”, “power”, “influence” are on the edge. They can be neutral, even respectful, but it is more realistic to assume a negative attitude in the case of this group of 22%. The main driver of anti-Semitism is envy and jealousy. The next category surely contains negative aspects with offensive and degrading characteristics. There were less of these in 2016 than one year earlier, but we see twice the amount of positive remarks in 2016 compared to the previous year. We can consider the statement “they are the same as others” as a positive remark and it is also a good sign when gastronomy comes to somebody’s mind in relation with Jews. Some respondents listed external physical signs or mentioned the conflict between Palestine and Israel without taking a concrete side.

Similarly to the associations with Israel, in this respect too, there is a weak relation between anti-Semitism, the choice of political parties and the type and direction of the association.

8% of Jobbik, 5% of strong anti-Semites, namely 10% of the overall population shared a positive thought. Many of them associated to a neutral word, the similar amount fell into the “slightly negative” money-richness-influence category. The only group where we can find a pattern of anti-Semitism is the group of specifically negative remarks. But even within this group, we only find 25% of strongly anti-Semitic peo-

ple and 23% of the supporters of the radically right-wing party. Again, there are less people who match a negative association to Jews on their own than those who are categorized as strongly anti-Semitic based on their reaction to the pre-written statements of the questionnaire. At the same time, it is a fact that there were negative or “partly-negative” (money, etc.) mentions in the non anti-Semitic group too, so in total, almost every third respondent falls into the negative field. *We can summarize that there is a perceptible difference between spontaneous anti-Semitism and questionnaire related responsiveness.*

The next question of the questionnaire was: “Do you have Jewish acquaintances?”, for which 22% of respondents answered “yes”. Although we didn’t point it out specifically in our analysis, we emphasize here that the existence of a Jewish acquaintance decreases significantly the probability of anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli attitudes: 84% of those who have Jewish acquaintances fell into the non anti-Semitic category, 62% fell into the same category out of those who haven’t got any Jewish acquaintances. We asked those who answered “yes”, how they learnt that their acquaintance is Jewish. (The table contains those respondents up to 22% who have Jewish acquaintances, their data makes 100%. So because of the small sample, we have to draw conclusions carefully.)

Table II. How do you know if someone is a Jew? (Open questions, proportion of responses, 2016)

	overall population 2016	overall population 2015
They said it themselves, it is not a secret	54	45
It seems from physical signs, religion and customs	18	19
Acquaintances, family members, friends	11	11
It came up during a conversation, others pointed it out	12	23
Name	2	1
Based on internal characteristics	3	1
In total	100	100

Although the correlation is statistically not significant, it is a fact that anti-Semitic respondents state that they found out themselves that their acquaintance is Jewish, based on the name, internal or external characteristics.

This is in line with the research results of 2014 which show that many of the an-

ti-Semitic respondents think that Jews are recognizable. Finally, the last open question referred to “typical” Jewish characteristics. This question revealed too that anti-Semitic people see more differences between Jews and non-Jews. 44% of respondents gave not available answers. Again, we grouped the similar remarks in the same categories.

Table 12. According to your opinion, what are the typical Jewish characteristics? (Open question, the proportion of responses, 2016)

	non anti-Semitic	moderately anti-Semitic	strongly anti-Semitic	voters of Jobbik	entire sample 2016	entire sample 2015
They are non-existent	7	2	1	12	5	18
Neutral: money, business mind, commerce, political instincts, saving	37	30	28	18	34	15
Neutral: face/features (sideburns, big nose, ear, etc.), clothing, body	24	28	31	24	26	25
Neutral: Religious rules, customs	15	15	7	17	13	17
Positive: cohesive, educated, intelligent, helpful, talented, persistent, good humour	12	3	2	9	9	13
Negative: greedy, desire for power, oppressing others, superior, selfish, jealous, snotty, lazy, sneaky, aggressive	5	22	31	20	13	12
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Most of the respondents mentioned neutral characteristics, interestingly enough, rather internal than external features versus the survey of 2015. It seems that the majority of the respondents associated to a religious orthodox rabbi than an average Jew when mentioning external features. Again, it is hard to tell if the emotions are positive or negative behind the money, business mind and other similar statements. The respondents mentioned laudatory and offensive characteristics in similar figures: positive statements referred primarily to

intelligence, knowledge and togetherness, negative ones to selfishness and ignoring others. Associations to neutral characteristics were dominant and there were only moderate differences in the pattern according to anti-Semitism and choice of political parties. In this case too, there is a moderately strong relation between spontaneously phrased anti-Semitism and questionnaire generated anti-Semitism. The systematic difference lies in the fact that anti-Semitic people think in a bigger proportion that Jews are recognizable.

9. THE PERCEPTION OF JOBBIK

In this chapter, we measured the change of perception of Jobbik: due to the declining tendency of populism over the past years, is Jobbik considered to be less anti-Semitic and anti-Roma?

Table 13. Opinions on the anti-Semitism of Jobbik (2016, percentage)

	„Do you consider Jobbik a(n) ...“		„How do you see the development of Jobbik recently?...“		
	anti-Semitic party?	non anti-Semitic party?	more anti-Semitic than before	now less anti-Semitic than before	just as anti-Semitic now than ever
Voters of DK and other small left-wing parties	67	27	32	26	36
Non anti-Semitic	57	40	26	23	45
Voters of MSZP	57	36	14	18	54
Voters of Fidesz	51	43	19	25	50
Moderately anti-Semitic	49	47	29	16	49
Strongly anti-Semitic	49	46	18	35	36
Uncertain respondents	44	38	18	16	38
Voters of Jobbik	32	62	14	34	31
Overall population	54	42	25	24	44

Opinions differ on the level of anti-Semitism of Jobbik, but the majority thinks that it is an anti-Semitic party. The populist strategy was not efficient from this point of view, the relative majority of the population didn't notice a significant change. Half of the those people who noticed some change think that anti-Semitism is increasing and only 24% of the entire sample was convinced of the repression of anti-Semitism.

It goes without saying that left-wing voters find Jobbik more anti-Semitic than the supporters of Jobbik (but many of them didn't even answer the question). It is a little more surprising that the level of anti-Semitism had little impact on the answers and there were only slight differences in the perception of the decline of the tendency. (In relation to that, non-anti-Semitic and left-wing voters were more sceptical.)

Table 14. Opinions of anti-Roma sentiment within Jobbik (2016, percentage)

	„Do you consider Jobbik a(n) ...”		„How do you see the development of Jobbik recently?...”		
	anti-Roma party?	non anti-Roma party?	more anti-Roma than before	now less anti-Roma than before	just as anti-Roma now than ever
Voters of DK and other small left wing parties	82	14	34	30	34
Non anti-Semitic	65	32	26	31	30
Voters of MSZP	63	34	25	37	32
Moderately anti-Semitic	61	37	28	34	34
Voters of Fidesz	59	38	20	30	46
Strongly anti-Semitic	56	42	21	34	43
Uncertain respondents	55	30	18	22	39
Voters of Jobbik	40	56	15	39	41
Overall population	63	35	25	32	40

To make a comparison, the same two questions were asked about Roma people too. More people think that Jobbik is an anti-Roma party than an anti-Semitic organization. At the same time, slightly more people think that it became more moderate in this respect, although those voters who perceived this shift are a minority. Distributions based on political party preference and the level of anti-Semitism show a similar situation. Jobbik is regarded as a much more anti-Roma party by the voters of the left-wing parties than by pro-government and uncertain voters. Compared to the small number of Jobbik voters, the differ-

ence is even bigger. As for the change of tendencies, left-wing voters rather saw an increasing level of anti-Roma attitudes than moderation, in total, there were no major differences.


When we draw the conclusions in this case, we have to be very careful as 40% of the entire sample was not ready to answer the questions related to the change of tendencies. A further 10% answered “I don’t know”. It seems that many respondents are uncertain of their attitude towards Jobbik, and it is also questionable whether they have enough concrete information to perceive changes in terms over time.

10. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

International comparisons can be very helpful when we put data in a broader context even if it is a small quantity referring to 2015. First, we compared the frequency of

relativising the Holocaust to other Western and Eastern European countries, completed by the supposed frequency of physical atrocities and by the fears they generate.

Chart 12. The supposed frequency of attacks against Jews and relativising Holocaust in a few European countries (2015, percentage, source: ADL¹¹)



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
There is a major difference in all aspects between Western and Eastern European countries. Although the relativising of the Holocaust (and verbal anti-Semitism) is more widespread in Eastern Europe, Western Europe citizens rather have to worry about physical atrocities. Especially, the French Jewish community is endangered, which is the largest Jewish community in Europe. Based on the monthly monitoring reports

of TEV on anti-Semitism, we can declare that physical atrocities against Jews are very rare in Hungary. In the light of this, it seems to be an exaggerated fear that 35% of Hungarians are worried about potential violent atrocities against Jews. 9% of them thought that these happened frequently in 2015.

Another source of data shows if respondents would be open to accept ethnic or other minorities as colleagues.

¹¹ <http://global100.adl.org/public/ADL-Global-100-Executive-Summary2015.pdf>

Chart 13. "Would feel uncomfortable if a colleague would be a ..." (number of those who agree, 2015, percentage, source: Eurobarometer¹²)



Hungarians are less accepting than the European average, but it is important to note that this is a major difference between Western and Eastern Europe, Hungary has similar results than other countries in the region. According to our own data, the perception of Roma is probably even worse

than that. (It is interesting that there was no difference in this respect compared to the EU average.) The perception of ethnicities who are identified as migrants deteriorated rapidly during 2015-2016. It is confirmed that the relative position of Jews is not bad, but we lag behind the European average.

¹² <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/yearFrom/1974/yearTo/2016/surveyKy/2077>

11. FACTORS DETERMINING ANTI-SEMITISM

As a summary of our analysis, we examine how much anti-Semitism can be explained by the different approaches discussed in the previous chapters individually and altogether. We look at the already presented correlations; we compare them to each other in the hierarchy: which seem to be the strongest and which ones are only slightly related to anti-Semitism. Normally, the logistic regression model is the right methodology to point this out in statistical analysis: this is an analysis which includes several variables (questions, statements) at the same time. The analysis has one outcome variable: the one question which we want to explain. In our case, this outcome variable is the complex anti-Semitism indicator which we used so far. We integrated the strongly and moderately anti-Semitic groups, so everyone was included who significantly agreed with anti-Semitic statements. The model forecasts, based on the explanatory variables (almost all statements and questions of our research), the probability of integration in the anti-Semitic group (table 15.) Hypothetically speaking, the indicator measuring the strength of the correlation is one if the model explains the explanatory variable in 100%. In other words, if one can predict from the explanatory variables that somebody is a member of an anti-Semitic group or not. The value of the indicator is zero, in this case, the variables of the model are completely independent from anti-Semitism. The explanatory variables of the first model, almost all the questions and statements of our questionnaire which are listed in the annex, are capable of predicting with the probability of 45% who will fall into the anti-Semitic category (this is considered a very high value in political sociology). In other words, anti-Semitism depends on those factors in 55% which are out of the scope of this research.

As a next step, we broke down this complex model in order to find out the strength of explanation for each question we raised separately in different chapters. In the second model, we exclusively listed the socio-demographic background characteristics. In the third model, we listed political self-identification and choice of political parties. The fourth one contains indicators related to xenophobia. The fifth one contains law-and-order, nationalism, euro-scepticism, the rejection of rule-breaking and political skepticism,. The sixth one includes the judgment of actual events. The seventh one contains the negative associations for open questions,. The eighth model covers Jewish acquaintances. We listed all questions and statements elaborated for this analysis in the annex.

The demographic model is scarcely significant which means *that social group affiliation is only marginally linked to responsiveness to anti-Semitism*. The impact of the model based on open questions is a little stronger. People are more open to anti-Semitism when they have negative attitudes towards Israel and Jews. The people who think of degrading characteristics when it comes to Jewish features are probably more anti-Semitic. At the same time, this model only explains anti-Semitism by 11% and strengthens the statement of chapter 8 that *the relation is of medium strength between the agreement with anti-Semitic statements ("connection") and spontaneous anti-Semitism*. The impact of political questions is of weak-medium strength. Based on the choice of political parties and political self-identification, we are able to predict by 7% if the respondent will be the member of the anti-Semitic group or not. A similar impact is measured in the case of the existence of Jewish acquaintances: it decreases the responsiveness to anti-Semitism.

Table 15. The comparison of the explanatory power of models introducing different approaches

model	The strength of the correlation ¹³
1. Entire	0,446
2. demographic (age, gender, type of settlement, financial status, religiousness)	0,042
3. political party preference and political self-identification (left-right, conservative-liberal, moderate-radical scales)	0,068
4. xenophobia against other ethnicities	0,141
5. political attitudes (law-and-order; nationalism; euroscepticism, "rule-breaking", rejection of otherness; pessimism) ¹⁴	0,239
6. open questions, negative associations to Jews	0,109
7. existence of Jewish acquaintance	0,059

Similarly to research findings of 2014 and 2015, this year, the models of xenophobia and social attitudes show robust explanatory power. Furthermore, among the attitudes, the need for the limitation of numbers of people of color was the strongest factor (see Annex) which is one form of demonstration of xenophobia. *A statement of available literature was confirmed by our study: prejudice is very rarely exists on its own. Anti-Semitism is a form of xenophobia too. Authoritarianism, the persecution of rule-breaking, law-and-order and nationalism lead to a*

political character structure which generates tendencies to anti-Semitism. Although, in total, it is the rejection of "otherness" which increases the probability of anti-Semitism, whether it is the rejection of migrants, homosexuals, drug consumers or other minorities and ethnicities. At the same time, statistical analysis underlines that the outcome, namely who will actually agree with anti-Semitic statements, mainly depends on factors out of our research scope. It is impossible to precisely predict this outcome a questionnaire.

¹⁴ Nagelkerke R-squared value. Its maximum value is one if the variants of the model completely explain the outcome variable (in this case it is anti-Semitism). Its value is zero if it doesn't explain it at all, if they are completely independent from each other. For statistical reasons, we coded all of the explanatory factors as so-called dichotomous variable: they can only be one of the two values (living in or outside of Budapest, young or old, graduated or non-graduated, etc.) Each model is significant at the level of 95%.

¹⁵ The model contains the following questions:

- Law-and-Order: "Would you support a severe prison sentence to those who consume drugs?", "Would you support the introduction of death penalty?"
- Nationalism: "We should stand up more strongly for the Hungarian minorities living in the surrounding countries"; "The defense of national values is more important than the EU membership"; "In important questions, people with strong nationalist values should be decision makers."
- "Rule breaking", "rejection of otherness": "Do you find homosexuality immoral?", "Would you make abortion process more severe?"
- Political pessimism: "One can only become rich by acting dishonestly"; "The people, if they are really dedicated, have all means to influence the destiny of the country." "Politicians, even if they often make mistakes want the best for the people"; "Nowdays, in many cases, Courts wouldn't do people justice."; "Those are very few who can count on future"; "Nowdays anything and anyone can be bought."

12. SUMMARY

First of all, our research aimed to highlight how much focus is given to issues related to Jews by the Hungarian public opinion. We can conclude, based on the high ratio of not applicable answers and on the frequency of inconsistent answers that the majority of respondents can't form a proper opinion in this topic, the issues we raised are unknown to them. They cannot relate to the questions focusing on Jews. Only one-tenth of the respondents could recall a public issue related to Jews of last year. On the other hand, it is not necessarily a small number, Hungarian society is even less aware of the situation of other ethnicities and minorities living in Hungary.

Secondly, before we present the results, we have to think about what it means (and what it doesn't mean) to agree with an anti-Semitic statement of a questionnaire. It is certain that it "only" means an opinion or attitude and surely not a behavior or act of discrimination. Although we don't know about the weight of the opinion, even answers with extreme values don't necessarily represent the personal experience of respondents. We learned a lot about the difference between the two categories: spontaneous anti-Semitic mentions and traditional agreement based anti-Semitism. A good part of anti-Semitic respondents, categorized by the traditional methodology, don't necessarily think of something negative when we mention Israel and the Jews, but if we call their attention to anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli statements, they are more likely to agree with or to "connect" to these. This connection can exist the other way around too; anti-Semitic thoughts can be born even by refusing the anti-Semitic statements. In any case, it seems clear that anti-Semitism rather means a receptivity than a solid state of mind. In our own interpretation, this variability is a natural characteristic of anti-Semitism.

When we use this methodology, it is always informative to ask the same questions

over and over again for several years, so we can take a look at long-term tendencies. These pieces of data refer to the popularity of views and misconceptions in relation to Jews (cognitive anti-Semitism) and to the emotional relationship, social distance (affective anti-Semitism). Based on this, anti-Semitism significantly increased in 2010 (according to our opinion in line with the mainstream appearance of Jobbik). Since then there was only very modest shift from that point. Between 2015 and 2016, the number of those respondents who agreed with the anti-Semitic statements increased. This increase in the cognitive dimension is partly due to the phenomenon we call "politics after the truth". In today's information flow, it is harder and harder to decide whether something is true or not. Conspiracy theories and misconceptions get broad publicity and it often happens that politicians intend to generate fear or disinformation on purpose. This can lie behind the spread of the denial or relativising of the Holocaust, as the general dislike to Jews and Israel decreased over the past year.

At the same time, this little more favorable emotional relation is also part of a broader context. The emotional anti-Semitism of the society is the manifestation of general xenophobia: those respondents who are more negative to other ethnicities are more dismissive to Jews. Of course, anti-Semitism has special features, but for the great majority of Hungarian society being a "Jew" is just another form of otherness (even symbolically) and citizens feel dislike in this respect just as they do to any other ethnicities. The rejection of Jews compared to other ethnicities is not so strong, we find migrants on the top of the list who are even more disliked than Roma people. The appearance of migrants (and Arab, black people too who are identified with migrants) changed the perception of Jews and placed them to a different context in the questionnaire. Out of all indi-

cators, we only see an improvement where respondents valued Jews in relation to migrants. Hungarian public opinion became more understanding to Israel, the flow of migrants rather led the dislike of many towards the Arab countries. It might seem a contradiction first that even the strongly anti-Semitic respondents were emphatic towards the Jewish state, but if we note that these are the respondents who are the most rejecting of migrants and Arabs in general, this relation is easier to understand.

One of the main questions of the research is to point out social groups and their motivation which are responsive to anti-Semitism. The answer of the analysis is that there is only marginal dependence between anti-Semitism and affinity of members of a social group. There is no relationship between the spread of anti-Semitism and type of work, settlement and religion. Those who have a university diploma, who have the highest income, women, the youngest and the eldest age groups members are less likely to be categorized as anti-Semitic but differences are very small. We can say that the voters of Jobbik and those who identify themselves as rather radical and right-wing voters than moderate and left-wing voters share anti-Semitic views in a bigger proportion, but even these factors give only partial explanation for anti-Semitism. According to the comparative analysis, euro-skepticism, law-and-order, authoritarian attitudes and the rejection of the different forms of otherness (homosexuality, drug consumption, and immigration) rather increase the probability of anti-Semitism. At the same time, pessimistic attitudes are independent from anti-Semitism. These questions of attitudes, together with xenophobia, are the strongest factors for explaining anti-Semitism.

The remembrance of the Shoah deeply divides the Hungarian society. Half of the respondents says that it should be kept on the agenda and the other half says we

should move on. In this question, there was no shift in terms of time although the support of statements backing up the open denial and relativising of the Holocaust increased from 7 14% of 2006 to 11 24% in 2016.

The anti-Semitism of Jobbik's voters moderately diminished from 2014 to 2015 but it remained permanent in 2016. The populist strategy wasn't really successful; the majority of respondents find this party anti-Semitic. Only few people reported some kind of improvement, and the same number of people noticed increasing anti-Semitism. At the same time, we have to add that free associations in relation to Jews showed only minor to moderate differences in cases of Jobbik and non-Jobbik voters.

When respondents heard the word "Jew", they mainly associated it with three things: religion, nation, country (descriptive, neutral mentions). Many of them thought about the Holocaust and persecution, money, influence and power. It is hard to tell whether this latter association stems from respect or jealousy which is often the motivation of anti-Semitism. At the same time, very negative, degrading mentions (greedy, eager for power, ignoring others) only came up at every tenth respondent and this was the ratio for positive mentions too (educated, cohesive, intelligent). The ratio was similar when we asked people about Israel and typical Jewish characteristics; the majority of them had neutral associations. This proves again that there is only a small part of voters which have a specific conception in mind in relation to Jews whether it is positive or negative.

Finally, international comparison shows that the level of anti-Semitism in Hungary is higher than in Western Europe but not remarkably different from Central-Eastern European countries. The situation of Hungarian Jews is more favorable here than in Western Europe where they have to face physical atrocities too.

ANNEX

The entire logistic regression model

	Modell	Béta	Standard hiba	Szignifikancia-szint	Exponenciális Béta (esélyhányados)
Budapest inhabitant	2	0,718	0,332	0,031	2,049
Having university diploma	2	0,309	0,368	0,402	1,362
Lower income group	2	0,223	0,276	0,419	1,25
Upper income group	2	-0,67	0,345	0,052	0,512
Doesn't attend church regularly	2	-0,014	0,252	0,954	0,986
Below 40 years of age	2	0,446	0,247	0,071	1,562
Attended only elementary group	2	-0,164	0,301	0,586	0,849
Man	2	-0,138	0,229	0,547	0,871
Certain voter	3	0,036	0,235	0,88	1,036
Jobbik voter	3	-0,249	0,395	0,528	0,78
Self-identification: conservative	3	-0,242	0,228	0,288	0,785
Self-identification: right wing	3	0,315	0,247	0,202	1,37
Self-identification: radical	3	-0,092	0,296	0,756	0,912
Would accept an Arab neighbour	4	-0,849	0,364	0,02	0,428
Would accept an Arab neighbour	4	-0,528	0,297	0,075	0,59
Would accept a Roma neighbour	4	0,318	0,306	0,299	1,374
Would accept a Chinese neighbour	4	-0,025	0,301	0,935	0,976
Would accept a homosexual neighbour	4	0,23	0,315	0,466	1,259
Would accept a Hungarian neighbour coming from Transsylvania	4	0,231	0,332	0,487	1,259
Would accept a skinhead neighbour	4	-0,031	0,307	0,919	0,969
Would accept Black neighbour	4	-0,875	0,321	0,006	0,417
Would accept a Romanian neighbour	4	0,093	0,316	0,768	1,098
Would accept a Swabian neighbour	4	-0,799	0,337	0,018	0,45
Would accept a migrant neighbour	4	0,288	0,398	0,469	1,334
Would make abortion process more severe	5	0,469	0,27	0,083	1,598
Would make immigration process more severe	5	-0,16	0,345	0,644	0,852
Rather religious	5	-0,437	0,254	0,086	0,646
Would support death penalty	5	0,33	0,247	0,182	1,391
Find homosexuality immoral	5	0,55	0,262	0,036	1,734
Would sentence severely those who consume drugs	5	0,312	0,265	0,238	1,366
Would limit the number of coloured people living in this country	5	1,063	0,28	0,000	2,894

Would rather not support EU membership	5	-0,023	0,297	0,939	0,978
Politicians, even if they often make mistakes, want the best for the people	5	0,194	0,268	0,469	1,214
One can only become rich in this country by acting dishonestly	5	0,373	0,276	0,176	1,452
We should stand up more strongly for the Hungarian minorities living in the surrounding countries	5	-0,569	0,252	0,240	0,566
The people if they really want it, have the opportunity to influence the fate of this country.	5	0,245	0,244	0,316	1,278
Nowdays, not even Courts would do justice to the people	5	0,432	0,254	0,089	1,54
The defense of our national values is more important than the EU membership.	5	-0,339	0,251	0,177	0,712
There are only few who can trust the future	5	0,207	0,262	0,43	1,229
In important question, those should be the decision makers who have strong nationalist values	5	0,587	0,273	0,032	1,798
The leaders of this country don't really care about people like you.	5	-0,221	0,265	0,404	0,802
Religion should be compulsory at schools	5	0,516	0,264	0,051	1,675
Nowdays everything and everyone can be bought	5	-0,564	0,284	0,470	0,569
It is today's moral obligation to take a position openly against the decision of the Trianon Treaty	5	0,255	0,265	0,336	1,29
Something negative comes to his/her mind when mentioning Israel	6	0,014	0,583	0,981	1,014
Something negative comes to his/her mind when mentioning Jews	6	1,482	0,486	0,002	4,403
Something negative comes to his/her mind when mentioning the typical characteristics of Jews	6	1,768	0,437	0,000	5,859
Has Jewish acquaintance	7	-0,309	0,194	0,000	0,445
Constant		-2,83	1,286	0,028	0,059

Note: outcome variable: complex indicator for anti-Semitism (cognitive and affective anti-Semitism, see chart 5). Significant variants of 95% are in bold. The number in the model column refers to the category of partial model of the variant (2: demography; 3: preference of political party and self-identification; 4: xenophobia gainst other ethnicities; 5: law-and-order, nationalism, authority, the rejection of breaking rules; 6: judgement of actual events). The odds ratio expresses how the explanatory variant increases the probability of anti-Semitism. For instance if someone would limit the number of coloured people

of color living in this country, based on his answers, he or she will fall into the anti-Semitic group with a 2.89 higher probability than someone who would not. A person who would accept a Swabian neighbor would fall into the anti-Semitic group with only a 0.45% probability, so it is more likely that he or she will not end up there. According to the multi-variable analysis, the agreement with the limitation of the number of people of color and the associations to the negative characteristics of Jews are the factors which increase most intensively the probability of becoming a member of an anti-Semitic group.

CONTACT AND SUPPORT

Action and Protection Foundation is the civil initiative of a number of Jewish organizations that is ready to take resolute steps to curb increasing widespread anti-Semitic manifestations.

In case anyone faces insults or anti-Semitic abuse due to a supposed or real Jewish background, do not remain silent, let us know, so that we can forward the case through the appropriate channels to the official organs required to take measures!

Notifications of such incidents are received by the Foundation through any of the following means:

HOTLINE (+36 1) 5 1 00 000

The website of Action and Protection Foundation: www.tev.hu/forrodrot
The Facebook page: www.facebook.com/tev-tett-es-vedelem-alapitvany

Action and Protection Foundation's undertaking can only be successful if great numbers share in our commitment to prepare the grounds for the right to fair process for all those who have suffered offenses. In aid of this cause please support the work of the Foundation with your contribution! Donations can be made to the Foundation on the following bank account:

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